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Abstract. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) enable secure exe-
cution of programs on untrusted hosts and cryptographically attest the
correctness of outputs. As these are complex systems, it is essential to for-
mally capture the exact security achieved by protocols employing TEEs,
and ultimately, prove their security under composition, as TEEs are typ-
ically employed in multiple protocols, simultaneously.
Our contribution is twofold. On the one hand, we show that under exist-
ing definitions of attested execution setup, we can realise cryptographic
functionalities that are unrealisable in the standard model. On the other
hand, we extend the adversarial model to capture a broader class of
realistic adversaries, we demonstrate weaknesses of existing security def-
initions this class, and we propose stronger ones.
Specifically, we first define a generalization of Functional Encryption that
captures Stateful and Randomised functionalities (FESR). Then, assum-
ing the ideal functionality for attested execution of Pass et al. (Euro-
crypt ’2017), we construct the associated protocol, Steel, and we prove
that Steel realises FESR in the universal composition with global sub-
routines model by Badertscher et al. (TCC ’2020). Our work is also
a validation of the compositionality of the Iron protocol by Fisch et al.
(CCS ’2017), capturing (non-stateful) hardware-based functional encryp-
tion.
As the existing functionality for attested execution of Pass et al. is too
strong for real world use, we propose a weaker functionality that allows
the adversary to conduct rollback and forking attacks. We demonstrate
that Steel (realising stateful functionalities), contrary to the stateless
variant corresponding to Iron, is not secure in this setting and discuss
possible mitigation techniques.
1 Introduction
Due to the rise of cloud computing, most people living in countries with active
digital economies can expect a significant amount of information about them
© IACR 2021. This article is the final version submitted by the author(s) to the
IACR and to Springer-Verlag on May 11th, 2021. The version published by Springer-
Verlag is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75248-4_25.
to be stored on cloud platforms. Cloud computing offers economies of scale for
computational resources with ease of management, elasticity, and fault tolerance
driving further centralization. While cloud computing is ubiquitously employed
for building modern online service, it also poses security and privacy risks. Cloud
storage and computation are outside the control of the data owner and users
currently have no mechanism to verify whether the third-party operator, even
with good intentions, can handle their data with confidentiality and integrity
guarantees.
Hardware-based solutions. To overcome these limitations, trusted execution en-
vironments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX [28], ARM Trustzone [49], RISC-V Key-
stone [33, 42], AMD-SEV [37], and AWS Nitro [55] provide an appealing way to
build secure systems. TEEs provide a hardware-protected secure memory region
called a secure enclave whose residing code and data are isolated from any lay-
ers in the software stack including the operating system and/or the hypervisor.
In addition, TEEs offer remote attestation for proving their trustworthiness to
third-parties. In particular, the remote attestation enables a remote party to
verify that an enclave has a specific identity and is indeed running on a genuine
TEE hardware platform. Given they promise a hardware-assisted secure abstrac-
tion, TEEs are now commercially offered by major cloud computing providers
including Microsoft Azure [52], Google Cloud [50], and Alibaba Cloud [5].
Modeling challenges. While TEEs provide a promising building block, it is not
straightforward to design secure applications on top of TEEs. In particular ap-
plications face the following three challenges: (1) Most practical applications
require combining trusted and untrusted components for improved performance
and a low trusted computing base; (2) TEEs are designed to protect only the
volatile, in-memory, “stateless” computations and data. Unfortunately, this ab-
straction is insufficient for most practical applications, which rely on stateful
computation on untrusted storage mediums (SSDs, disks). Ensuring security for
such untrusted storage mediums is challenging because TEEs are prone to roll-
back attacks; and lastly, (3) TEE hardware designs are prone to numerous side
channel attacks exploiting memory access patterns, cache timing channels, etc.
These side channel attacks have the potential to completely compromise the
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity (remote attestation) of enclaves.
Therefore, it is important to carefully model the security achieved by the
protocols of such systems as well as the assumptions in the cryptography and the
hardware, and the trust afforded in protocol participants. Ideally such modelling
must be compositional to facilitate the construction of larger systems based on
smaller hardware and cryptography components. Given a sufficiently expressive
model of TEEs, they can be used as a powerful setup assumption to realise many
protocols.
The model of Pass, Shi, and Tramer (PST) [48] takes an initial step towards
modelling protocols employing TEEs. The PST model provides a compositional
functionality for attested execution and shows how to instantiate various primi-
tives impossible in the standard model, as well as some limitations of TEEs. The
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PST model was first weakened in [59], which provides a compelling example of
how an excessively weak enclave, susceptible to side channel attacks that break
confidentiality (but not integrity and authenticity), can still be used as setup
for useful cryptographic primitives. Both models, however, live at two opposite
extremes, and thus fail to capture realistic instantiations of real world trusted
execution.
Functional encryption & limitations. One of the core primitives that enables
privacy preserving computation and storage is Functional Encryption (FE), in-
troduced by [17]. FE is a generalisation of Attribute/Identify Based Encryp-
tion [56, 53], that enables authorized entities to compute over encrypted data,
and learn the results in the clear. In particular, parties possessing the so-called
functional key, skf , for the function f , can compute f(x), where x is the plain-
text, by applying the decryption algorithm on skf and an encryption of x. Access
to the functional key is regulated by a trusted third party. While out of scope
for our work, identifying such a party is an interesting question that requires
establishing metrics for the trustworthiness of entities we might want to be able
to decrypt functions, and the kind of functions that should be authorised for a
given level of trust. An obvious option for the role of trusted authority would
be that of a data protection authority, who can investigate the data protection
practices of organisations and levy fines in case these are violated. Another ap-
proach could be decentralising this role, by allowing the functional key to be
generated collectively by a number of data owners [24, 1].
FE is a very powerful primitive but in practice highly non-trivial to con-
struct. Motivated by the inefficiency of existing instantiations of FE for arbi-
trary functions, the work of [30] introduces Iron, which is a practically efficient
protocol that realises FE based on Intel’s SGX. In [30] the authors formally
prove security of the proposed protocol, however their proof is in the standalone
setting. In a related work, Matt and Maurer [45] show (building on [3]) that
composable functional encryption (CFE) is impossible to achieve in the stan-
dard model, but achievable in the random oracle model. For another important
variant of the primitive, namely, randomized functional encryption, existing con-
structions [2, 34, 41], are limited in the sense that they require a new functional
key for each invocation of the function, i.e., decryptions with the same functional
key always return the same output. Finally, existing notions of FE only capture
stateless functionalities, which we believe further restricts the usefulness and
applicability of the primitive. For instance, imagine a financial institution that
sets its global lending rate based on the total liquidity of its members. Financial
statements can be sent, encrypted, by each member, with each of these trans-
actions updating the global view for the decryptor, who can then compute the
function’s result in real time.
Given the above limitations, in this work we leverage the power of hardware
assisted computation to construct FE for a broader class of functionalities under
the strongest notion of composable security.
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1.1 Our Contributions
We consider a generalization of FE to arbitrary stateful and probabilistic func-
tionalities (FESR), that subsumes multi-client FE [24] and enables crypto-
graphic computations in a natural way, due to the availability of internal ran-
domness. Our contributions are as follows:
– We formally define functional encryption for stateful and randomized func-
tionalities (FESR), in the Universal Composition (UC) setting [30].
– We construct the protocol Steel and prove that it realizes FESR in the
newly introduced Universal Composition with Global Subroutines (UCGS)
model [9]. Our main building blocks are: (1) the functional encryption scheme
of [30] and (2) the global attestation functionality of PST. Our treatment
lifts the PST model to the UCGS setting, and by easily adapting our proofs
one can also establish the UCGS-security of [30]. Our security proof shows
that one can satisfy a FE ideal functionality as defined in [45], relying on
hardware instead of Random Oracles, and for the larger function class of
FESR when additionally relying on a common reference string.
– We introduce a weaker functionality for attested execution in the UCGS
model to allow rollback and forking attacks, and use it to demonstrate that
Steel does not protect against these. Finally, we sketch possible mitigation
techniques.
1.2 Technical Overview
Attested execution via the global attestation functionality Gatt of PST [48]. Our
UC protocols assume access to the global attestation functionality, Gatt, that
captures the core abstraction provided by a broad class of attested execution
processors, such as Intel SGX [28]. It models multiple hardware-protected mem-
ory regions of a TEE, called secure enclaves. Each enclave contains trusted code
and data. In combination with a call-gate mechanism to control entry and exit
into the trusted execution environment, this guarantees that this memory can
only be accessed by the enclave it belongs to, i.e., the enclave memory is pro-
tected from concurrent enclaves and other (privileged) code on the platform.
TEE processing environments guarantee the authenticity, the integrity and the
confidentiality of their executing code, data and runtime states, e.g. CPU regis-
ters, memory and others.
Gatt is parametrised by a signature scheme and a registry that captures all
the platforms that are equipped with an attested execution processor. At a
high level, Gatt allows parties to register programs and ask for evaluations over
arbitrary inputs, while also receiving signatures that ensure correctness of the
computation. Since the manufacturer’s signing key pair can be used in multiple
protocols simultaneously, Gatt is defined as a global functionality that uses the
same key pair across sessions.
4
Universal composition with global subroutines [10]. In our work we model global
information using the newly introduced UCGS framework, which resolves in-
consistencies in GUC [20], an earlier work that aims to to model executions in
the presence of global functionalities. UCGS handles such executions via a man-
agement protocol, that combines the target protocol and one or more instances
of the global functionality, and creates an embedding within the standard UC
framework. In our work, Gatt (cf. Section 2.3) is modeled as a global functionality
in the UCGS framework (updating the original PST formulation in GUC).
Setting, adversarial model & security. Our treatment considers three types of
parties namely, encryptors, denoted by A, decryptors, denoted by B, as well as a
single party that corresponds to the trusted authority, denoted by C. The adver-
sary is allowed to corrupt parties in B and request for evaluations of functions of
its choice over messages encrypted by parties in A. We then require correctness
of the computation, meaning that the state for each function has not been tam-
pered with by the adversary, as well as confidentiality of the encrypted message,
which ensures that the adversary learns only the output of the computation
(and any information implied by it) and nothing more. Our treatment covers
both stateful and randomized functionalities.
Steel: UCGS-secure FE for stateful and randomized functionalities. Steel is exe-
cuted by the sets of parties discussed above, where besides encryptors, all other
parties receive access to Gatt, abstracting an execution in the presence of secure
hardware enclaves. Our protocol is based on Iron [30], so we briefly revisit its
main protocol operations: (1) Setup, executed by the trusted party C, installs
a key management enclave (KME), running a program to generate public-key
encryption and digital signature, key pairs. The public keys are published, while
the equivalent secrets are kept encrypted in storage (using SGX’s terminology,
the memory is sealed). Each of the decryptors installs a decryption enclave (DE),
and attests its authenticity to the KME to receive the secret key for the encryp-
tion scheme over a secure channel. (2)KeyGen, on input function F, calls KME,
where the latter produces a signature on the measurement of an instantiated en-
clave that computes F. (3) When Encrypt is called by an encryptor, it uses
the public encryption key to encrypt a message and sends the ciphertext to the
intended recipients. (4) Decrypt is executed by a decrypting party seeking to
compute some function F on a ciphertext. This operation instantiates a match-
ing function enclave (or resume an existing one), whose role is that of computing
the functional decryption, if an authorised functional key is provided.
Steel consists of the above operations, with the appropriate modifications
to enable stateful functionalities. In addition, Steel provides some simplifications
over the Iron protocol. In particular, we repurpose attestation’s signature capabil-
ities to supplant the need for a separate signature scheme to generate functional
keys, and thus minimise the trusted computing base. In practice, a functional
key for a function F can be produced by just letting the key generation process
return F; as part of Gatt’s execution, this produces an attestation signature σ
over F, which becomes the functional key skF for that function, provided the
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generating enclave id is also made public (a requirement for verification, due to
the signature syntax of attestation in Gatt).
The statefulness of functional encryption is simply enabled by adding state
storage to each functional enclave. Similar to [48], a curious artefact in the
protocol’s modeling is the addition of a “backdoor” that programs the output of
the function evaluation subroutine, such that, if a specific argument is set on the
input, the function evaluation returns the value of that argument. The reason
for this addition is to enable simulation of signatures over function evaluations
that have already been computed using the ideal functionality. We note that
this addition does not impact correctness, as the state array is not modified if
the backdoor is used, nor confidentiality, since the output of this subroutine is
never passed to any other party besides the caller B. Finally, a further addition
is that our protocol requires the addition of a proof of plaintext knowledge
on top of the underlying encryption scheme. An efficient implementation for
such a modification can be realised by drawing on the techniques of signed
ElGamal [54], where the random coin used during encryption is sufficient to
prove knowledge of the plaintext. However, this contstruction would require the
use of the random oracle and generic group model, or at best the algebraic group
model [32], making compositionality non-obvious, and is thus not considered in
full beyond this remark. The Steel protocol definition is presented in Section 4.
Security of Steel. Our protocol uses an existentially unforgeable under chosen
message attacks (EU-CMA) signature scheme, Σ, a CCA-secure public-key en-
cryption scheme, PKE, and a non-interactive zero knowledge scheme, N. Infor-
mally, Σ provides the guarantees required for realising attested computation (as
discussed above), PKE is used to protect the communication between enclaves,
and for protecting the encryptors’ inputs. For the latter usage, it is possible
to reduce the security requirement to CPA-security as we additionally compute
a simulation-extractable NIZK proof of well-formedness of the ciphertext that
guarantees non-malleability.
Our proof is via a sequence of hybrids in which we prove that the real world
protocol execution w.r.t. Steel is indistinguishable from the ideal execution, in
the presence of an ideal functionality that captures FE for stateful and ran-
domized functionalities. The goal is to prove that the decryptor learns nothing
more than an authorized function of the private input plaintext, thus our hy-
brids gradually fake all relevant information accessed by the adversary. In the
first hybrid,3 all signature verifications w.r.t. the attestation key are replaced
by an idealized verification process, that only accepts message/signature pairs
that have been computed honestly (i.e., we omit verification via Σ). Indistin-
guishability is proven via reduction to the EU-CMA security of Σ. Next we fake
all ciphertexts exchanged between enclaves that carry the decryption key for
the target ciphertext, over which the function is evaluated (those hybrids re-
3 Here we omit some standard UC-related hybrids.
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quire reductions to the CCA security of PKE).4 The next hybrid substitutes ZK
proofs over the target plaintexts with simulated ones, and indistinguishability
with the previous one reduces to the zero knowledge property of N. Then, for
maliciously generated ciphertexts under PKE – which might result via tampering
with honestly generated encryptors’ ciphertexts – instead of using the decryption
operation of PKE, our simulator recovers the corresponding plaintext using the
extractability property of N. Finally, we fake all ciphertexts of PKE, that encrypt
the inputs to the functions (this reduces to CPA security). Note that, in [30], the
adversary outputs the target message, which is then being encrypted and used
as a parameter to the ideal world functionality that is accessed by the simulator
in a black box way. In this work, we consider a stronger setting in which the ad-
versary directly outputs ciphertexts of its choice. While in the classic setting for
Functional Encryption (where Iron lives) simulation security is easily achieved
by asking the adversarial enclave to produce an evaluation for the challenge ci-
phertext, in FESR the simulator is required to conduct all decryptions through
the ideal functionality, so that the decryptor’s state for that function can be
updated. We address the above challenge by using the extractability property of
NIZKs: for maliciously generated ciphertexts our simulator extracts the original
plaintext and asks the ideal FESR functionality for its evaluation. Simulation-
extractable NIZK can be efficiently instantiated, e.g., using zk-SNARKs [12].
Security of our protocol is formally proven in Section 5. The simulator therein
provided could be easily adapted to show that the Iron protocol UCGS-realises
Functional Encryption, by replacing the NIZK operations for maliciously gener-
ated ciphertexts with a decryption from the enclave, as described above.
Rollback & forking attacks. Modeling attested execution via Gatt facilitates com-
posable protocol design, however, such a functionality cannot be easily realised
since real world adversaries can perform highly non-trivial rollback and forking
attacks against hardware components. In Section 6, we define a weaker func-
tionality for attested execution, called Grollbackatt , that aims to capture rollback
and forking attacks. To achieve this, we replace the enclave storage array in Gatt
with a tree data structure. While the honest party only ever accesses the last
leaf of the tree (equivalent to a linked list), a corrupt party is able to provide
an arbitrary path within the tree. This allows them to rollback the enclave, by
re-executing a previous (non-leaf) state, and to support multiple forks of the
program by interactively selecting different sibling branches. We give an exam-
ple FESR function where we can show that correctness does not hold if Grollbackatt
is used instead of Gatt within Steel, and discuss how countermeasures from the
rollback protection literature can be adopted to address these attacks, with a
consideration on efficiency.




Hardware is frequently used to improve performance or circumvent impossibility
results, e.g. [46, 4, 27]. As a relevant example, Chung et al. [26] show how to use
stateless hardware tokens to implement functional encryption.
The use of attestation has been widely adopted in the design of computer
systems to bootstrap security [47]. In addition to formalising attested execution,
Pass, Shi and Tramer (PST) [48] show that two-party computation is realisable
in UC only if both parties have access to attested execution, and fair two-party
computation is also possible if additionally both secure processors have access to
a trusted clock. The PST model is the first work to formalise attested execution
in the UC framework. The compositional aspect of UC allows for the reused
of the model in several successive works [59, 61, 25, 23]. Other attempts at
providing a formal model for attested execution include the game-based models
of Barbosa et al. [16], Bahmani et al. [13], Fisch et al. [30]. The latter model
arises from the need to evaluate the security of the aforementioned Iron [31],
which first realises Functional Encryption in the hardware setting. A further
extension implementing verifiable functional encryption is presented in Suzuki
et al. [58].
A significant source of vulnerabilities in Trusted Execution Environments
arise from side-channel attacks; many have been conducted in the literature
against Intel SGX (see [51] for a non-comprehensive review). One class of vul-
nerabilities are that of state-continuity, or rollback attacks (also known as re-
set attacks in the cryptographic literature), also being a common attack vector
against third-party untrusted computing infrastructure. An attacker who is in
control of the underlying infrastructure can at times simply restart the system
to restore a previous system state. Yilek [62] presents a general attack that is
applicable to both virtual machine and enclave executions: an adversary capable
of executing multiple rollback attacks on IND-CCA or IND-CPA secure encryp-
tion schemes might learn information about encrypted messages by running the
encryption algorithm on multiple messages with the same randomness. In the
absence of true hardware-based randomness that cannot be rolled back, these
kinds of attacks can be mitigated using hedged encryption, a type of key-wrap
scheme [36], such that for each encryption round, the original random coin and
the plaintext are passed through a pseudorandom function to generate the ran-
domness for the ciphertext.
The area of rollback attacks on TEEs is well studied. Platforms like SGX
[22], TPMs [43], etc. provide trusted monotonic counters, from which it is pos-
sible to bootstrap rollback-resilient storage. However, trusted counters are too
slow for most practical applications. Furthermore, they wear out after a short
period of time. As their lifetime is limited, they are unreliable for applications
that require frequent updates [44]. Moreover, an adversary that is aware of this
vulnerability can attack protocols that rely exclusively on counters, by instan-
tiating a malicious enclave on the same platform that artificially damages the
counters.
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To overcome the limitation of SGX counters, ROTE [44] uses a consensus
protocol to build a distributed trusted counter service, with performance neces-
sarily reduced through several rounds of network communication. In the same
spirit, Ariadne [57] is an optimized (local) synchronous technique to increment
the counter by a single bit flip for deterministic enclaves.
Speicher [14] and Palaemon [35] proposed an asynchronous trusted counter
interface, which provide a systematic trade-off between performance and roll-
back protection, addressing some limitations of synchronous counters. The asyn-
chronous counter is backed up by a synchronous counter interface with a period
of vulnerability, where an adversary can rollback the state of a TEE-equipped
storage server in a system until the last stable synchronous point. To protect
against such attacks, these systems rely on the clients to keep the changes in
their local cache until the counter stabilizes to the next synchronisation point.
Lightweight Collective Memory (Brandenburger et al. [18]) is a proposed
framework that claims to achieve fork-linearizability: each honest client that
communicates with a TEE (on an untrusted server that might be rolled back) can
detect if the server is being inconsistent in their responses to any of the protocol
clients (i.e. if they introduce any forks or non-linearity in their responses). Fi-
nally, [39, 40, 60], protect hardware memory against active attacks, while [38, 6],




In the current section, we define the syntax of Functional Encryption.
Functional Encryption is a primitive defined over a class of functions F : X →
Y, consisting of the following PPT algorithms:
– (Setup): given security parameter 1λ as input, KeyGen outputs master key-
pair (mpk,msk)
– (Key generation): Setup takes msk,F ∈ F and returns functional key skF
– (Encryption): given string x ∈ X and mpk, Enc returns ciphertext ct or an
error
– (Decryption): on evaluation over some ciphertext ct and functional key skF,
Dec returns y ∈ Y
Confidentiality A confidential Functional Encryption scheme allows only the
function evaluation F(x) to be learned from the ciphertext ct and functional key
skF.
Correctness A functional encryption scheme satisfies correctness if, for all func-
tions F ∈ F and all x ∈ X , the statement F(x)← Dec(Enc(mpk, x), skF)
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Composable Functional Encryption Matt and Maurer [45] shows that the notion
of functional encryption is equivalent, up to assumed resources, to that of an
access control (AC) repository, where some parties A are allowed to upload data,
and other parties B are allowed to retrieve some function on that data, if they
have received authorisation (granted by a party C). A party B does not learn
anything else about the stored data, besides the function they are authorised to
compute (and length leakage F0).
2.2 UC background
Universal Composability (UC), introduced by Canetti [19], is a security frame-
work that enables the security analysis of cryptographic protocols. It supports
the setting where multiple instances of the same, or different protocols, can be
executed concurrently. Many extensions and variants of the framework have been
proposed over the years; our treatment is based on the recently released Uni-
versal Composability with Global Subroutines framework (UCGS) [10] and the
2020 version of UC [19]. We briefly summarise the aspects of UC and UCGS
necessary to understand our work between this section and Appendix B, where
we define all terminology used.
Universal Composability Consider two systems of PPT interactive Turing
machine instances (π,A,Z) and (φ,S,Z), where Z is the initial instance, and
π,A (and respectively φ,S) have comparable runtime balanced by the inputs of
Z. We say that the two systems are indistinguishable if Z making calls to π,A
(resp. φ,S) cannot distinguish which system it is located in. The two systems
are commonly referred to as the real and ideal world (respectively). Z can make
calls to instances within the protocol by assuming the (external) identity of arbi-
trary instances (as defined by the control function). Depending on the protocol
settings, it might be necessary to restrict the external identities available to the
environment. A ξ-identity-bounded environment is limited to assume external
identities as specified by ξ, a polynomial time boolean predicate on the current
system configuration.
We now recall a few definitions. Please consult [19, 10] or (appendix B) for
the formal definitions of terms such as balanced, respecting, exposing, compliant.
Definition 1 (UC emulation [19]). Given two PPT protocols π, φ and some
predicate ξ, we say that π UC-emulates φ with respect to ξ-identity bound envi-
ronments (or π ξ-UC-emulates φ) if for any balanced ξ-identity-bounded envi-
ronment and any PPT adversary, there exists a PPT simulator S such that the
systems (φ,S,Z) and (π,A,Z) are indistinguishable.
Given a protocol π which UC-emulates a protocol φ, and a third protocol ρ,
which calls φ as a subroutine, we can construct a protocol where all calls to φ
are replaced with calls to π, denoted as ρφ→π.
Theorem 1 (Universal Composition [19]). Given PPT protocols π, φ, ρ and
predicate ξ, if π, φ are both subroutine respecting and subroutine exposing (see
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B), ρ is (π, φ, ξ)-compliant and π ξ-UC-emulates φ, then protocol ρφ→π UC-
emulates ρ
By the composition theorem, any protocol that leverages subroutine φ in its
execution can now be instantiated using protocol π.
UCGS As the name suggests, generalised UC (GUC) [20] is an important gen-
eralization of the UC model. It accounts for the existence of a shared subroutine
γ, such that both ρ and its subroutine π (regardless of how many instances of π
are called by ρ) can have γ as a subroutine. The presence of the global subroutine
allows proving protocols that rely on some powerful functionality that needs to
be globally accessible, such as a public key infrastructure (PKI) [21], a global
clock [8], or trusted hardware [48].
Unfortunately GUC has inconsistencies and has not been updated from the
2007 to the 2020 version of UC.5 Universal Composability with Global Subrou-
tines [10] aims to rectify these issues by embedding UC emulation in the presence
of a global protocol within the standard UC framework.
To achieve this, a protocol π with access to subroutine γ is replaced by a
new structured protocol µ =M [π, γ], known as management protocol; µ allows
multiplexing a single instance of π and γ into however many are required by
ρ, by transforming the session and party identifiers. µ is a subroutine exposing
protocol, and is given access to an execution graph directory instance, which
tracks existing machines within the protocol, and the list of subroutine calls
(implemented as a structured protocol). The execution graph directory can be
queried by all instances within the extended session of µ, and is used to redirect
the outputs of π and γ to the correct machine.
Below we revisit the UC emulation with global subroutines definition from [10].
Definition 2 (UC emulation with global subroutines [10]). Given proto-
cols π, φ, and γ, π ξ-UC emulates φ in the presence of γ ifM [π, γ] ξ-UC emulates
M [φ, γ]
Now we state the main UCGS theorem.
Theorem 2 (Universal Composition with Global subroutines [10]). Given
subroutine-exposing protocols π, φ, ρ, and γ, if γ is a φ-regular setup and sub-
routine respecting, φ, π are γ-subroutine respecting, ρ is (π, φ, ξ)-compliant and
(π,M [x, γ], ξ)-compliant for x ∈ {φ, π}, then if π ξ-UC-emulates φ in the pres-
ence of γ, the protocol ρφ→π UC-emulates ρ in the presence of γ.
5 In a nutshell the inconsistency arises from a discrepancy in the proof that emu-
lation for a single-challenge session version, called EUC (used to prove protocols
secure), implies UC-emulation for the multi-challenge GUC notion (used to prove
the composition theorem).
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2.3 The Gatt functionality
We now reproduce the Gatt global functionality defined in the PST model [48].
The functionality is parameterised with a signature scheme and a registry to
capture all platforms with a TEE. The below functionality diverges from the
original one in that we let vk be a global variable, accessible by enclave programs
as Gatt.vk. This allows us to use Gatt for protocols where the enclave program
does not trust the caller to its procedures to pass genuine inputs, making it
necessary to conduct the verification of attestation from within the enclave.
Functionality Gatt[Σ, reg, λ]
State variables Description
vk Master verification key, available to enclave programs
msk Master secret key, protected by the hardware
T ← ∅ Table for installed programs
On message initialize from a party P :
let (spk, ssk)← Σ.Gen(1λ), vk← spk,msk← ssk
On message getpk from a party P :
return vk
On message (install, idx, prog) from a party P where P.pid ∈ reg:
if P is honest then
assert idx = P.sid
generate nonce eid ∈ {0, 1}λ, store T [eid,P ] = (idx, prog, ∅)
send eid to P
On message (resume, eid,input) from a party P where P.pid ∈ reg:
let (idx, prog,mem)← T [eid,P ], abort if not found
let (output,mem′)← prog(input,mem) , store T [eid,P ] = (idx, prog,mem′)
let σ ← Σ.Sign(msk, (idx, eid,prog, output)) and send (output, σ) to P
The Gatt functionality is a generalisation over other TEE formalisations, such
as the one in [30], which tries to closely model some SGX implementation details.
For instance, their hardware primitive distinguishes between local and remote
attestation by exposing two sets of functions to produce and verify reports (for
local attestation) and quotes (for remote attestation). Both data structure in-
clude enclave metadata, a tag that can uniquely identify the running program,
input and output to the computation and some authentication primitive based
on the former (MAC for local reports, signature for remote quotes). The Gatt
primitive, intended as an abstraction over different vendor implementations, re-
moves much of this detail: both local and remote attestation consist in verifying
the output of a resume call to some enclave through a public verification key,
available both to machines with and without enclave capabilities. The output
of computations is similarly the (anonymous) id of the enclave, the UC session
id, some unique encoding for the code computed by the enclave (which could
be its source code, or its hash), and the output of the computation. Unlike in
the Iron model, input does not have to be included in the attested return value,
12
but if security requires parties to verify input, the function ca return it as part
of its output. On enclave installation, its memory contents are initialised by the
specification of its code; this initial memory state is represented by symbol ∅.
3 Functional encryption for stateful and randomized
functionalities
Our primitive of FESR offers a generalisation over Functional Encryption, to
allow computing of stateful and randomized functionalities functionalities over
arbitrary ciphertexts. In this section we define the ideal functionality of func-
tional encryption for stateful and randomized functionalities (FESR).
The syntax for this new primitive matches that of Functional Encryption
schemes (outlined in section 2.1). The two primitives differ by the parametrisa-
tion of the class of computable functions F; in the case of FESR, this is defined
as
F : X × S ×R → Y × S
where S = {0, 1}s(λ),R = {0, 1}r(λ) for polynomials s(·) and r(·).
The definition of the primitive follows from the ideal functionality, given
below.
3.1 UC functionality
Our treatment considers the existence of several parties of type A (encryptors),
B (decryptors), and a singular trusted authority C. The latter is allowed to run
the KeyGen,Setup algorithms; parties of type A run Enc, and those of type B
run Dec. The set of all decryptors (resp. encryptors) is denoted by B (resp. A).
When the functionality receives a message from such a party, their UC extended
id is used to distinguish who the sender is and store or retrieve the appropriate
data. For simplicity, in our ideal functionality we refer to all parties by their
type, with the implied assumption that it might refer to multiple distinct UC
parties. For the sake of conciseness, we also omit including the sid parameter as
an argument to every message.
The functionality reproduces the four algorithms that comprise functional
encryption. During KeyGen, a record P is initialised for all t instances of B, to
record the authorised functions for each instance, and its state. The Setup call
marks a certain B as authorised to decrypt function F, and initialises its state to
∅. The Enc call allows a party A, B, to provide some input x, and receive a unique
identifying handle h. This handle can then be provided, along with some F, to
a decryption party to obtain an evaluation of F on the message stored therein.
Performing the computation will also result in updating the state stored in P.
Functionality FESR[sid, F,A,B,C]
The functionality is parameterized by the randomized function class F such that
for each F ∈ F : X × S × R → Y × S, over state space S and randomness
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space R, and by three distinct types of party identities A,B,C interacting with
the functionality via dummy parties (that identify a particular role). For each
decryptor/function pair, a state value is recorded.
State variables Description
F0 Leakage function returning the length of the message
setup[·]← false Table recording which parties were initialized.
M[·]← ⊥ Table storing the plaintext for each message handler
P[·]← ⊥ Table of authorized functions and their states for all de-
cryption parties
On message (setup, P ) from party C, for P ∈ {A,B}:
setup[P ]← true
send (setup, P ) to A
On message (setup, P ) from A, for P ∈ {A,B}:
setup[P ]← true
P[P,F0]← ∅
send setup to P
On message (encrypt, x) from party P ∈ {A,B}:
if setup[P ] = true ∧ x ∈ X then
compute h← getHandle
M[h]← x
send (encrypted, h) to P
On message (keygen,F,B) from party C:
if F ∈ F+ ∧ setup[B] = true then
send (keygen,F,B) to A and receive Ack
P[B,F]← ∅
send (assigned,F) to B
On message (decrypt, h,F) from party B:
x←M[h]
if C is honest then
if P[B,F] 6= ⊥ ∧ x ∈ X then
r←R
s← P[B,F]




send (decrypt, h,F, x) to A and receive (decrypted, y)
return (Decrypted, y)
The functionality is defined for possible corruptions of parties in B, A. If C
is corrupted, we can no longer guarantee the evaluation to be correct, since C
might authorize the adversary to compute any function in F. In this scenario,
we allow the adversary to learn the original message value x and to provide an
arbitrary evaluation y.
In this work we primarily focus on the security guarantees provided by FE,
which is confidentiality of the encrypted message against malicious decryptors,
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B. Yet, it provides security against malicious encryptors, A, thus it satisfies input
consistency, originally introduced by [11] (in which A and/or C might also get
corrupted ).
Our definition is along the lines of [11, 45]; in order To allow stateful and
randomized functions, we extend the function class with support for private state
and randomness as above. Whenever B accesses a function on the data from the
repository, the repository draws fresh randomness, evaluates the function on the
old state (for the current B and function). The function updates the state and
returns an evaluation.
The property of confidentiality for functional encryption also holds for FESR,
as the decrypting party is only allowed to learn the function evaluation (and not
the state, before or after decryption). Correctness for FESR is slightly stronger
than in 2.1: it is necessary for the state at any decryption to be uniquely deter-
mined by the sequence of previous decryption for the same F,B pair (without
allowing B to influence its value, besides the choice of which ciphertexts to de-
crypt). Intuitively, the ideal world AC repository presented models both confi-
dentiality and correctness. by inspection of the four lines r ← R, s ← P[B,F],
(y, s′)← F(x, s, r), and P[B,F]← s′.
In addition, our definition is the first one that captures stateful and random-
ized functionalities, where the latter refers to the standard notion of randomized
functionalities in which each invocation of the function uses independent ran-
domness. Therefore, our protocol achieves a stronger notion of randomized FE
than [2, 34, 41], which require a new functional key for each invocation of the
function, i.e., decryptions with the same functional key always return the same
output.
4 A UC-formulation of Steel
In this section we present Steel in the UCGS setting. As we already state above,
our treatment involves three roles: the key generation party C, the decryption
parties B, and the encryption parties A. Among them, only the encryptor does
not need to have access to an enclave. Confidentiality and correctness of the
protocol in the face of an adversarial B hold from the proof of indistinguishability
between real and ideal world in 5. . We do not give any guarantees of security
for corrupted A,C; although we remark informally that, as long as its enclave is
secure, a corrupted C has little chances of learning the secret key. Besides the
evaluation of any function in F it authorises itself to decrypt, it can also fake or
extract from proofs of ciphertext validity π by authorizing a fake reference string
crs. Before formally presenting our protocol we highlight important assumptions
and conventions:
– For simplicity of presentation, we assume a single instance each for A, B
– all communication between parties (α, β) occurs over secure channels SCβα,SC
α
β
– Functional keys are (attestation) signatures by an enclave progKME on input
(keygen,F) for some function F; it is easy, given a list of keys, to retrieve
the one which authorises decryptions of F
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– keyword fetch retrieves a stored variable from memory and aborts if the
value is not found
– on keyword assert the program checks that an expression is true, and
proceeds to the next line, aborting otherwise
– all variables within an enclave are erased after use, unless saved to encrypted
memory through the store keyword
Protocol Steel is parameterised by a function family F : X ×S ×R → Y ×S,
UC parties A,B,C, a CCA secure public key encryption scheme PKE, a EU-CMA
secure signature scheme Σ, a Robust non-interactive zero-knowledge scheme N,
and security parameter λ.
Protocol Steel[F,A,B,C,PKE,Σ,N, λ]
State variables Description
mpk← ⊥ Local copy of master public key for participants
prog{KME,DE,FE} ← . . . Source code of enclaves as defined below
K[·]← ∅ Table of function keys at B
Key Generation Authority C:
On message (Setup, P ):
if mpk = ⊥ then
eidKME ← Gatt.install(C.sid, progKME)
send Get to CRS and receive (Crs, crs)
(mpk, ·)← Gatt.resume(eidKME, (init, crs,C.sid))
if P = A then
send (setup,mpk) to SCA
else if P = B then
send (setup,mpk, eidKME) to SCB and receive (provision, σ, eidDE, pkKD)
(ctkey, σsk)← Gatt.resume(eidKME, (provision, (σ,eidDE, pkKD, eidKME))))
send (provision, ctkey, σsk) to SCB
On message (Keygen,F,B):
assert F ∈ F ∧mpk 6= ⊥
((keygen,F), σ)← Gatt.resume(eidKME, (keygen,F))
skF ← σ; send (keygen, (F, skF)) to SCB
Encryption Party A:
On message (Setup,mpk) from SCC:
send Get to CRS and receive (Crs, crs)
store mpk, crs; return setup
On message (encrypt,m):
assert mpk 6= ⊥ ∧m ∈ X
ct
r←− PKE.Enc(mpk,m)
π ← P((mpk, ct), (m, r), crs), ctmsg ← (ct, π)
send (write, ctmsg) to REP and receive h
return (encrypted, h)
Decryption Party B:
On message (Setup,mpk, eidKME) from SCC:
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store mpk; eidDE ← Gatt.install(B.sid, progDE)
send Get to CRS and receive (Crs, crs)
((pkKD, ·, ·), σ)← Gatt.resume(eidDE, init-setup, eidKME, crs,B.sid)
send (provision, σ, eidDE, pkKD) to SCC and receive (provision, ctkey, σKME)
Gatt.resume(eidDE, (complete-setup, ctkey, σKME))
return setup
On message (keygen, (F, skF)) from SCC:
eidF ← Gatt.install(B.sid, progFE[F])
(pkFD, σF)← Gatt.resume(eidF, (init,mpk,B.sid))
K[F]← (σF, eidF, pkFD, skF)
return (assigned, F )
On message (decrypt,F, h):
assert K[F] 6= ⊥
send (read, h) to REP and receive ctmsg
(σF, eidF, pkFD, skF)← K[F]
((ctkey, crs), σDE)← Gatt.resume(eidDE, (provision, σF, eidF, pkFD, skF,F))
((computed, y), ·)← Gatt.resume(eidF, (run, σDE, eidDE, ctkey, ctmsg, crs,⊥))
return (Decrypted, y)
progKME:
on input (init, crs, idx):
assert pk = ⊥; (pk, sk)← PKE.PGen()
store sk, crs, idx; return pk
on input (provision, (σDE, eidDE, pkKD, eidKME)):
vkatt ← Gatt.vk; fetch crs, idx
assert Σ.Vrfy(vkatt, (idx, eidDE, progDE, (pkKD, eidKME, crs), σDE)






on input (init-setup, eidKME, crs, idx):
assert pkKD 6= ⊥
(pkKD, skKD)← PKE.Gen()
store skKD, eidKME, crs, idx
return pkKD, eidKME, crs
on input (complete-setup, ctkey, σKME):
vkatt ← Gatt.vk
fetch eidKME, skKD, idx




on input (provision, σ, eid, pkFD, skF,F):
fetch eidKME, vkatt, sk, idx
m1 ← (idx, eidKME, progKME, (keygen,F))
m2 ← (idx, eid, progFE[F], pkFD)
assert Σ.Vrfy(vkatt,m1, skF) and
Σ.Vrfy(vkatt,m2, σ)
return PKE.Enc(pkFD, sk), crs
progFE[F]:
on input (init,mpk, idx):
assert pkFD = ⊥
(pkFD, skFD) = PKE.Gen(1
λ)
mem← ∅; store skFD,mem,mpk, idx
return pkFD
on input (run, σDE, eidDE, ctkey, ctmsg, crs, y′):
if y′ 6= ⊥
return (computed, y′)
vkatt ← Gatt.vk; (ct, π)← ctmsg
fetch skFD,mem,mpk, idx
m← (idx, eidDE, progDE, ctkey, crs)
assert Σ.Vrfy(vkatt,m, σDE)
sk = PKE.Dec(skFD, ctkey)
assert N.V((mpk, ct), π, crs)




As we mention in the Introduction, our modeling considers a “backdoor” in
the progFE.run subroutine, such that, if the last argument is set, the subroutine
just returns the value of that argument, along with a label declaring computation.
The addition of the label “computed” is necessary, otherwise the backdoor would
allow producing an attested value for the public key generated in subroutine
progFE.init.
As a further addition we strengthen the encryption scheme with a plaintext
proof of knowledge (PPoK). For public key pk, ciphertext ct, plaintext m, cipher-
text randomness r, the relation R = {(pk, ct), (m, r)|ct = PKE.Enc(mpk,m; r)}
defines the language LR of correctly computed ciphertexts. As a chosen-plaintext
secure PKE scheme becomes CCA secure when extended with a simulation-
extractable PPoK this is a natural strengthening of the CCA security require-
ment of Iron. However, it enables the simulator to extract valid plaintexts from
all adversarial ciphertexts. In our security proof the simulator will submit these
plaintexts to FESR on behalf of the corrupt B to keep the decryption states of
the real and ideal world synchronized.
5 UC-security of Steel
We now prove the security of Steel in the UCGS framework. To make the PST
model compatible with the UCGS model, we first define the identity bound ξ.
The identity bound ξ on the environment. Our restrictions are similar to [48],
namely we assume that the environment can access Gatt in the following ways:
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(1) Acting as a corrupt party, and (2) acting as an honest party but only for
non-challenge protocol instances.
We now prove our main theorem.
Theorem 3. Steel (Section 4) UC-realises the FESR functionality (Section 3)
in the presence of the global functionality Gatt and local functionalities CRS,
REP,SC, with respect to the identity bound ξ defined above.
We present a simulator algorithm SFESR such that UC emulation 1 holds
for protocols Steel and IDEALFESR (the protocol encapsulating the ideal func-
tionality and a set of dummy parties corresponding to the real-world parties
in Steel). Following [45], our proof considers static corruption of a single party
B, we did, however, not encounter any road-blocks to adaptive corruption of
multiple decryptors besides increased proof notational complexity. The environ-
ment is unable to distinguish between an execution of the Steel protocol in the
real world, and the protocol consisting of SFESR, dummy parties A, C and ideal
functionality FESR. Both protocols have access to the shared global subroutines
of Gatt. While hybrid functionalities REP, SC, CRS (defined in A.4) are only
available in the real world and need to be reproduced by the simulator, we use
SC in the simulator to denote simulated channels, either between the simulator
and corrupted parties (for corrupt parties), or between the simulator and itself
(for honest parties).
Given protocols Steel, FESR, and Gatt, Steel ξ-UC emulates FESR in the
presence of Gatt ifM [Steel, Gatt] ξ-UC emulatesM [FESR, Gatt] (see Definition 2).
We focus or exposition on the messages exchanged between the environment and
the machine instances executing Steel, FESR, and Gatt, since the machine M is
simply routing messages; i.e. whenever Z wants to interact with the protocol,
M simply forwards the message to the corresponding party; the same holds for
Gatt.
The simulator operates in the ideal world, where we have the environment Z
sending message to dummy protocol parties which forward their inputs to the
ideal functionality FESR. SFESR is activated either by an incoming message from
a corrupted party or the adversary, or when FESR sends a message to the ideal
world adversary. As A is a dummy adversary which normally forwards all queries
between the corrupt party and the environment, SFESR gets to see all messages
Z sends to A. The simulator is allowed to send messages to the FESR and Gatt
functionalities impersonating corrupt parties. In the current setting, the only
party that can be corrupted such that FESR still gives non trivial guarantees is
party B. Thus, whenever the real world adversary or the ideal world simulator
call Gatt.install and Gatt.resume for the challenge protocol instance, they must do
so using the identity of B.
Simulator SFESR[PKE,Σ,N, λ, F]
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State variables Description
H[·]← ∅ Table of ciphertext and handles in public repository
K ← [] List of progFE[F] enclaves and their eidF
G ← {} Collects all messages sent to Gatt and its response
B ← {} Collects all messages signed by Gatt
(crs, τ)← N.S1 Simulated reference string and trapdoor
For Key Generation Authority C:
On message (setup, P ) from FESR:
if mpk = ⊥ then
eidKME ← Gatt.install(C.sid, progKME)
(mpk, ·)← Gatt.resume(eidKME, init)
if P = A then
send (setup,mpk) to SCA
else if P = B then
send (setup,mpk, eidKME) to SCB and receive (provision, σ, eidDE, pkKD)
assert (C.sid, eidDE, progDE, pkKD) ∈ B[σ]
(ctkey, σsk)← Gatt.resume(eidKME, (provision, (σ,eidDE, pkKD, eidKME, crs))))
send (provision, ctkey, σsk) to SCB
On message (keygen, F,B) from FESR:
assert F ∈ F ∧mpk 6= ⊥
((keygen,F), σ)← Gatt.resume(eidKME, (keygen,F))
skF ← σ
send (keygen, (F, skF)) to SCB
For Decryption Party B:
On message Get from party B to CRS:
send (CRS, crs) to B
On message (read, h) from party B to REP:
send (decrypt,F0, h) to FESR on behalf of B and receive |m|
assert |m| 6= ⊥
ct← PKE.Enc(mpk, 0|m|)
π ← N.S2(crs, τ, (mpk, ct))
ctmsg ← (ct, π); H[ctmsg]← h
send (read, ctmsg) to B
On message (install, idx, prog) from party B to Gatt:
eid ← Gatt.install(idx, prog)
G[eid].install← (idx, prog)
// G[eid].install[1] is the program’s code
forward eid to B
On message (resume, eid, input) from party B to Gatt:
// The Gatt registry does not allow B to access eidKME in real world
assert G[eid] 6= ⊥ ∧ eid 6= eidKME
if G[eid].install[1] 6= progFE[·] ∨ input[−1] 6= ⊥ then
(output, σ)← Gatt.resume(eid, input)
G[eid].resume← G[eid].resume ‖ (σ, input, output)
B[σ]← (G[eid].install[0], eid,G[eid].install[1], output)
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if G[eid].install[1] = progDE ∧ input[0] = provision then
(provision, σ, eid, pkFD, skF,F)← input
fetch (·, (init-setup, eidKME, crs), ·) ∈ G[eid].resume
assert (idx, eidKME, progKME, (keygen,F)) ∈ B[skF]
assert (idx, eidDE, progDE, ctkey, crs) ∈ B[σDE]
forward (output, σ) to B
else
idx, progFE[F]← G[eid].install
(run, σDE, eidDE, ctkey, ctmsg, crs,⊥)← input
assert (σF, (init), (pkFD)) ∈ G[eid].resume
assert (idx, eid, progFE[F], pkFD) ∈ B[σF]
assert (idx, eidDE, progDE, ctkey, crs)) ∈ B[σDE]
// If the ciphertext was not computed honestly and saved to H
if H[ctmsg] = ⊥ then
(ct, π)← ctmsg
(m, r)← N.E(τ, (mpk, ct), π)
if m = ⊥ then send (decrypt,F,⊥) to B and abort
send (encrypt,m) to FESR on behalf of B and receive h
H[ctmsg]← h
h← H[ctmsg]
send (decrypt,F, h) to FESR on behalf of B and receive y
((computed, y), σ)← Gatt.resume(eidF, (run,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥, y))
G[eid].resume← G[eid].resume ‖ (σ, input, (computed, y)))
B[σ]← (G[eid].install[0], eid,G[eid].install[1], (computed, y))
forward ((computed, y), σ) to B
Designing the simulation The ideal functionality FESR and protocol Steel
share the same interface consisting of messages setup, keygen, encrypt,
decrypt. During Steel’s setup, the protocol generates public parameters when
first run, and provisions the encrypted secret key to the enclaves of B. As neither
of these operations are executed by the ideal functionality, we need to simulate
them, generating and distributing keys outside of party C.
As in Steel, we distribute the public encryption key on behalf of C to any
newly registered B and A over secure channels. Once B has received this message,
it will try to obtain the (encrypted) decryption key for the global PKE scheme
from party C and its provision subroutine of progKME. Since C is a dummy party
in the ideal world, it would not respond to this request, so we let SFESR respond.
In Steel key parameters are generated within the key management enclave, and
communication of the encrypted secret key to the decryption enclave produces
an attestation signature. Thus, the simulator, which can access Gatt imperson-
ating B, is required to install an enclave. Because of the property of anonymous
attestation, the environment cannot distinguish whether the new enclave was
installed on B or C. If the environment tries to resume the program running
under eidKME through B, this is intercepted and dropped by the simulator.
Before sending the encrypted secret key, the simulator verifies that B’s public
key was correctly produced by an attested decryption enclave, and was initialised
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with the correct parameters. If an honest enclave has been instantiated and we
can verify that it uses pkKD, eidKME, crs, we can safely send the encrypted sk to
the corrupted party as no one can retrieve the decryption key from outside the
enclave.
On message (keygen,F, B) from the functionality after a call to keygen,
SFESR simply produces a functional key by running the appropriate progKME
procedure through Gatt. Similarly, on receiving (read, h) for REP, SFESR pro-
duces an encryption of a canonical message (a string of zeros) and simulates the
response.
When the request to compute the functional decryption of the corresponding
ciphertext is sent to progFE[F], we verify that the party B has adhered to the
Steel protocol execution, aborting if any of the required enclave installation or
execution steps have been omitted, or if any of the requests were made with
dishonest parameters generated outside the enclave execution (we can verify this
through the attestation of enclave execution). If the ciphertext was not obtained
through a request to REP, we use the NIZK extractor to learn the plaintext m
and submit a message (encrypt,m) to FESR on behalf of the corrupt B. This
guarantees that the state of FESR is in sync with the state of progFE[F] in the
real world.
If all such checks succeed, and the provided functional key is valid, SFESR
fetches the decryption from the ideal functionality. While the Steel protocol
ignores the value of the attested execution of run, we can expect the adversary
to check its result for authenticity. Therefore, it is necessary to pass the result
of our decryption y through the backdoor we constructed in progFE[F]. This will
produce an authentic attestation signature on y, which will pass any verification
check convincingly (as discussed in the previous section, the backdoor does not
otherwise impact the security of the protocol).
The full proof of security is available in appendix C.
6 Rollback and Forking Attacks
While the functionality modelled by Gatt is a meaningful first step for modeling
attested execution, it is easy to argue that it is not realisable (in a UC-emulation
sense) by any of the existing Trusted Execution Environment platforms to date.
In a follow-up paper, Tramer et al. [59] weaken the original Gatt model to allow
complete leakage of the memory state. This is perhaps an excessively strong
model, as the use of side channel attacks might only allow a portion of the
memory or randomness to be learned by the adversary. Additionally, there are
many other classes of attacks that can not be expressed by this model. We now
extend the Gatt functionality to model rollback and forking attacks against an
enclave.
6.1 Grollbackatt functionality
Our model of rollback and forking attacks is drawn from the formulation ex-
pressed in Matetic et al. [44], but with PST’s improved modelling of attestation,
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which does not assume perfectly secure authenticated reads/writes between the
attester and the enclave.
Matetic et al. model rollback by distinguishing between enclaves and enclave
instances. Enclave instances have a distinct memory state, while sharing the
same code. As with Gatt, where the outside world has to call subroutines indi-
vidually, the environment is not allowed to interact directly with a program once
it is instantiated, except for pausing, resuming, or deleting enclave instances. Ad-
ditionally, their model provides functions to store encrypted memory outside the
enclave (Seal) and load memory back (Unseal).
In a typical rollback attack, an attacker crashes an enclave, erasing its volatile
memory. As the enclave instance is restarted, it attempts to restart from the
current state snapshot. By replacing this with a stale snapshot, the attacker is
able to rewind the enclave state.
In a forking attack an attacker manages to run two instances of the same
enclave concurrently, such that, once the state of one instance is changed by an
external operation, querying the other instance will result in an outdated state.
This relies on both enclaves producing signature that at the minimum attest
the same program. On a system where attestation uniquely identifies each copy
of the enclave, a forking attack can still be launched by an attacker conducting
multiple rollback attacks and feeding different stale snapshots to a single enclave
copy [18].
Our new functionality Grollbackatt employs this idea to model the effect of both
rollback and forking attacks. We replace the internal mem variable of Gatt with
a tree data structure. The honest caller to the functionality will always continue
execution from the memory state of an existing leaf of the tree while an adversary
can specify an arbitrary node of the tree (through a unique node identifier),
to which the state of the enclave gets reset. The output mem′ will then be
appended as a new child branch to the tree. To model a rollback attack, the
adversary specifies the parent node for the next call to resume (or any ancestor
node to execute a second rollback). To model a forking attack, the adversary can
interactively choose nodes in different branches of the tree. The functionality is
parameterised with a signature scheme and a registry to capture all platforms
with a TEE, like in the original formulation.
Functionality Grollbackatt [Σ, reg, λ]
State variables Description
vk Master verification key, available to enclave programs
msk Master secret key, protected by the hardware
T ← ∅ Table for installed programs
On message initialize from a party P :
let (spk, ssk)← Σ.Gen(1λ), vk← spk,msk← ssk
On message getpk from a party P :
return vk
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On message (install, idx, prog) from a party P where P.pid ∈ reg:
if P is honest then
assert idx = P.sid
generate nonce eid ∈ {0, 1}λ, store T [eid,P ] = (idx, prog,root,Tree(∅))
send eid to P
On message (resume, eid,input, node) from a party P where P.pid ∈ reg:
let (idx, prog, lastnode, tree)← T [eid,P ], abort if not found
if P is honest then
let node← lastnode
let mem← access(tree, node)
let (output,mem′)← prog(input,mem)
let tree′, child← insertChild(tree, node,mem′)
let update T [eid, P ] = (idx, prog, child, tree′)
let σ ← Σ.Sign(msk, (idx, eid,prog, output)) and send (output, σ) to P
The proposed rollback model is perhaps somewhat reductive, as it only allows
“discrete” rollback operations, where memory states are quantised by program
subroutines. It is conceivable that real world attackers would have a finer-grained
rollback model, where they can interrupt the subroutine’s execution, and resume
from an arbitrary instruction.
Attack on stateful functional encryption Although our protocol uses prob-
abilistic primitives, we deem the generic reset attack presented in [62] unrealistic
for TEE platforms such as SGX, where an enclave is allowed direct access to a
hardware-based source of randomness [7].
On the other hand, it easy to find a protocol-specific rollback attack on
Steel. While F’s state remains secret to a corrupt B interacting with Grollbackatt
(the memory is still sealed when stored), an adversary can make enclave calls
produce results that would be impossible in the simpler model. As an example,
take the following function from F that allows setting a key and sampling the
output of a PRF function F for a single message:
function PRF-Wrapper(x,mem)









An adversary who has completed initialisation of its decryption enclave with
enclave id eidDE, obtained a functional key sk through the execution of keygen
on eidKME, and initialised a functional enclave for PRF-Wrapper with enclave
id eidF, public key pkFD and attestation σ, executes the current operations for
three ciphertexts ctK, ctx, ctx′ , encrypting a key K and plaintexts x, x′:
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1: ((ctkey, crs), σDE)← Gatt.resume(eidDE, (provision, σ, eid, pkFD, sk))
2: ((computed, ACK), ·)←Grollbackatt .resume(eidF, (run, vkatt, σDE, eidDE, ctkey, ctk, crs,⊥), node)
3: // node is the node id for a leaf for eidF’s mem tree
4: ((computed, y), ·)←Grollbackatt .resume(eidF, (run, vkatt, σDE, eidDE, ctkey, ctx, crs,⊥), node′)
5: // node′ is the node id for a leaf for eidF’s mem tree
6: ((computed, y′), ·)←Grollbackatt .resume(eidF, (run, vkatt, σDE, eidDE, ctkey, ctx′ , crs,⊥), node′)
7: // node′ is the same node id as in the previous call (and thus to the parent
of the current leaf in mem)
As a result of this execution trace, the adversary violates correctness by
inserting an illegal transition (with input ε) in the stateful automaton for PRF-
Wrapper, from state access(tree, node′.child) = ~1 back to access(tree, node′) =
[K], and then back to state ~1 with input x′. The adversary can then obtain the
illegal set of values y← FK(x) and y′ ← FK(x′), whereas in the ideal world after
obtaining y, the only possible output for the function would be ⊥ (the only legal
transition from state ~1 leads back to itself). The simulator is unable to address
this attack, as the memory state is internal to the ideal functionality, and the
key will always be erased after the second call.
One might think that the simulator could respond by sampling a value from
the uniform distribution and feed it through the enclave’s backdoor; however,
the environment can reveal the key K and messages x, x′ to the adversary, or
conversely the adversary could reveal the uniform value to the environment.
Thus the environment can trivially distinguish between the honest PRF output
and the uniform distribution, and thus between the real and ideal world. Note
that this communication between environment and adversary is necessary for
universal composition as this leakage of K, x, x′ could happen as part of a wider
protocol employing functional encryption.
Mitigation techniques In Section 1.3, we showed that rollback resilience for
trusted execution environments is an active area of research, with many compet-
ing protocols. However, most solutions inevitably entail a performance trade-off.
Due to the modular nature of Steel, it is possible to minimise the performance
impact. Observe that party B instantiates a single DE and multiple FE. We
can reduce the performance penalty by making only DE rollback resilient. We
guarantee correctness despite rollbacks of FE, by encoding a counter alongside
the function state for each F. On a decryption request, the progFE enclave is
required to check in with the progDE enclave to retrieve the decryption key as
part of the provision call. To enable rollback resilience, we include the counter
stored by progFE as an additional parameter of this call. progDE compares the
counter received for the current evaluation of F with the one received during
the last evaluation, and authorises the transfer of the secret key only if greater.
Before evaluating the function, progFE increases and stores its local counter.
To achieve rollback resilience for the progDE enclave, we can rely on existing
techniques in the literature, such as augmenting the enclave with asynchronous
monotonic counters [14], or using protocols like LCM [18] or ROTE [44]. For-
malising how these protocols can be combined with the Grollbackatt functionality to
achieve the fully secure Gatt is left for future work.
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We also note that Stateless functional encryption as implemented in IRON
is resilient to rollback and forking because there is little state held between com-
putation. Since we assume C is honest, the only programs liable to be attacked
are DE and FE[F].
DE stores PKE parameters after init-setup, and the decrypted master secret
key after complete-setup. The adversary could try to gain some advantage by
creating multiple PKE pairs before authenticating with the authority, but will
never has access to the raw msk unless combining it with a leakage attack.
Denial of Service is possible by creating concurrent enclaves (either DE or FE)
with different public keys, and passing encrypted ciphertexts to the "wrong"
copy which would be unable to decrypt (but it’s not clear what the advantage
of using rollback attacks would be, as the adversary could always conduct a DoS
attack by denying the necessary resources to the enclave).
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A Primitives
We now formally define basic notation and definitions used throughout the paper.
Notation. For a bit-string x, |x| denotes the length of x, and λ denotes the
security parameter. For a distribution D over a set X , x← D, denotes sampling
an element x ∈ X , according to D, and x ← X denotes sampling a uniform
element x from X . “≈” denotes computational indistinguishability, and negl(λ)
denotes an unspecified, negligible function, such that negl(λ) ≤ 1λc for all c ∈ R.
For an algorithm A, using y ← A(x) we denote the execution of A on input
x, receiving output y. In case A is randomized, y is a random variable and
A(x; r) denotes the execution of A on input x with randomness r. An algorithm
A is probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if A is randomized and for any x, r ∈
{0, 1}∗, the computation of A(x; r) terminates in a number of steps polynomial
in (|x|+ |r|).
A.1 Public-key encryption
In the current section we define public-key encryption for chosen plaintext (CPA)
and chosen ciphertext (CCA) attacks. Note that in the latter, the adversary is
allowed to access the decryption oracle even after receiving the challenge cipher-
text, usually referred to as CCA2 secure encryption.
The syntax of a public-key encryption scheme is defined below.
PKE syntax. A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme is a triple of algorithms
PKE = (PGen,Enc,Dec) with the following syntax:
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– (Key generation): PGen receives a security parameter λ, and outputs a fresh
key pair (pk, sk)← PGen(1λ).
– (Encryption): Enc receives a public key pk and a message m and produces a
ciphertext ct.
– (Decryption): Dec receives a secret key sk and a ciphertext ct and outputs a
message m.
In the following sections the security parameter will be implicit when calling
PGen. A PKE scheme must satisfy the following correctness property.
Correctness. For any message m,
Pr[(pk, sk)← PGen(1λ); ct← Enc(pk,m);m′ ← Dec(sk, ct) : m = m′] = 1.
CPA security game. For any PPT adversary A, b ∈ {0, 1} and PKE scheme
PKE, we consider the following CPA security game, denoted by GccaPKE,A(λ, b):
– (pk, sk)← PGen(1λ).
– A receives pk and oracle access to Oenc(·) := Enc(pk, ·).
– A outputs (m0,m1).
– ct← Enc(pk,mb).
– A receives ct and oracle access to Oenc(·)
– A outputs b′.
– Output b′ = b.
Definition 3 (CPA security). A public-key encryption scheme PKE is CPA-
secure if for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl such
that ∣∣∣Pr[GcpaPKE,A(λ, 0) = 1]− Pr[GcpaPKE,A(λ, 1)] = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
CCA security game. For any PPT adversary A, b ∈ {0, 1} and PKE scheme
PKE, we consider the following CCA security game, denoted by GccaPKE,A(λ, b):
– (pk, sk)← PGen(1λ).
– A receives pk and oracle access to Odec(·) := Dec(sk, ·).
– A outputs (m0,m1).
– ct← Enc(pk,mb).
– A receives ct and oracle access to Odec(·) but is not allowed to query ct.
– A outputs b′.
– Output b′.
Definition 4 (CCA security). A public-key encryption scheme PKE is CCA-
secure if for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl such
that ∣∣Pr[GccaPKE,A(λ, 0) = 1]− Pr[GccaPKE,A(λ, 1)] = 1]∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
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A.2 Signatures
In the current section we define existential unforgeability against chosen message
attacks (EU-CMA).
Digital signatures syntax. A digital signature (DS) scheme is a triple of algo-
rithms Σ = (Gen,Sign,Vrfy) with the following syntax:
– (Key generation): Gen receives a security parameter λ and outputs a fresh
public and secret keypair (spk, ssk)← Gen(λ).
– (Signing): Sign receives a signing key ssk and a message m and produces a
signature σ ← Sign(ssk,m).
– (Verification): Vrfy receives a public key spk, a message m and a signature
σ, and outputs a bit b← Vrfy(spk,m, σ).
In the following sections the security parameter will be implicit when calling
Gen.
A DS scheme must satisfy the following correctness property.
Correctness. For any message m,
Pr[(spk, ssk)← Gen(1λ);σ ← Sign(ssk,m) : Vrfy(spk,m, σ) = 1] = 1.
Unforgeability game. For any PPT adversary A and DS scheme Σ, we consider
the following security game, denoted by Geu-cmaΣ,A (λ):
– (spk, ssk)← Gen(1λ).
– A receives spk and oracle access to Osign(·) := Sign(ssk, ·). Let Q be the set
of queries made by A.
– A outputs (m,σ).
– If Vrfy(spk,m, σ) = 1 and m /∈ Q, output 1, otherwise, output 0.
Definition 5 (Unforgeability). A DS scheme Σ is EU-CMA-secure, if for all
PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl such that
Pr
[




Definition 6 (Robust NIZK [29]). LetW be a witness relation for a language
L ∈ NP. A non-interactive zero-knowledge argument system for W is a vector
of algorithms (G,P,V,S = (S1,S2)), satisfying the following properties:
– Completeness. For any y ∈ L and any w such that (y, w) ∈ W,
Pr
[
V(crs, y, π) = 1




– Zero-knowledge. For all non-uniform PPT adversaries A, we have
Pr[AP(crs,·,·)(crs) = 1 | crs← G(1λ)] ≈
Pr[AS(ĉrs,τ,·,·)(ĉrs) = 1 | (ĉrs, τ)← S1(1λ)],
where S(ĉrs, τ, y, w) = S2(ĉrs, τ, y) if (y, w) ∈ W, otherwise outputs ⊥.
– Simulation sound extractability. There exists a PPT algorithm E, such
that for all PPT algorithms A, we have
Pr
V(ĉrs, y, π) = 1 ∧w /∈ W(y) ∧




w ← E(τ, y, π)
 ≤ negl(λ),
where Q denotes the simulation queries and answers (yi, πi), produced by the
interaction between A and S2.
A.4 Additional Functionalities
Secure Channel Functionality SCSR is the secure channel between source S
and receiver R.
Functionality SCSR
On message (send,m) from S:
let M ←M ‖ length(m)
return (sent,m) to R
On message getmsgs from A:
output M on the backdoor tape
This is quite a strong functionality. The adversary is not activated upon
sending, but can later on request the length of messages. This is in line with
the modelling of [45] (and [11]). Like them, we focus on the security guarantees
against a corrupted party B and this channel simplifies the simulation of network
interactions. We do, however, not see any fundamental obstacles to adopting a
more realistic secure channel functionality such as that of [19].
Communication notation. send (Msg,m) to SCSR and receive (Msg,m′) de-
notes the secure transmission of a message (Msg,m) from S to R. After sending
the message S waits for the reply (Msg,m′) over SCRS . When the identity of the
receiver or the sender is obvious from the context, we might use shorthands SCS
or SCR respectively.
We write send (msg,m) to A, p to denote a delayed (insecure) output to
p. A is first informed about (msg,m) and can then determine when and if to
deliver the message to p.
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Repository Functionality REPW,R is based on the repository functionality
of [45], parametrised by a writing party W and a set of reading parties R
Functionality REPW,R
On message (write, x) from party W :
let h← getHandle
let M [h]← x
return h
On message (read, h) from party r ∈ R:
return M[h]
Common Reference String Functionality The CRS[D] functionality, based
on the presentation of [15], is parametrised by a distribution D.
Functionality CRS[D]
On message Get from a party P :
if crs = ⊥ then
let crs← D
return crs to P
This functionality has a simple interface: on a request from any protocol party
(or the adversary), a CRS string sampled from distribution D is returned. Once
the CRS has been sampled, an instance of CRSG [D] will always return the same
string. While this functionality is insufficient to realise global protocols in the
GUC setting, where it is subsumed by the augmented CRS functionality [20], our
usage of the functionality in the following sections is limited to local protocols.
As a result, we are not concerned with the type of deniability attacks that are
addressed by the new functionality.
B UC definitions
We provide the definitions for the essential constructs of Universal Composability
necessary for understanding this paper. We refer to the original paper [19] and
the UCGS paper [10] for a more comprehensive treatment,
Computational model In the UC framework, protocols are executed by inter-
active Turing machines (ITM). An ITM is a universal machine with additional
tapes for encoding its identity, activation status, and incoming or outgoing mes-
sages to other machines (including a dedicated tape, the backdoor tape, that
an adversary can use to communicate with a machine that corresponds to a
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corrupted party). The state (configuration) of a machine instance consists of
the content of all its tapes. The state of a system of machine instances consists
of a collection of such instances with distinct read-only identity tapes (known
as the extended identity of an instance); it contains the ITM’s code, a session
identifier, sid and a party identifier, pid. When instantiated, a machine is given
an “import” parameter, which determines how many operations the instance is
allowed to execute before it terminates; machines will typically run a number of
operations bounded by a polynomial of the import.
The execution of a system of instances is managed by a control function.
Given an initial instance, the control function determines what ITIs can be in-
stantiated. The execution begins with the activation of the initial ITI with some
input, and ends when it reaches a halting configuration. During the execution,
the initial instance might invoke new instances through its external-write tape,
if allowed by the control function; these new instances may also instantiate new
instances. If an instance M ′ accepts some input from instance M , or sends an
output message to M which is not rejected, M ′ is known as a subroutine of M .
An extended system allows the control function to modify instances’ external-
write instructions; this mechanism can be used to modify the system such that,
given an instance M that attempts to instantiate subroutine M ′, a different
subroutine M ′′ gets instantiated, unbeknownst to M . To allow representing dy-
namic protocols where the number of participants and the code they run might
change over their execution, a protocol session is defined as a set of instances
running the same protocol (the main parties of the protocol session, denoted by
a shared session id and code within their identity tapes), having been invoked
with the intention of interacting with each other with a common purpose. The
extended session of a protocol is the set comprising of the main parties of the
protocol session, the subroutines of parties already in the extended session, and
machines invoked by the sub-parties of the extended session (a sub-party is an
ITI that is in the extended session, but not as a main party).
To address modelling specific behaviour, a structured protocol is a set of two
(or more) nested ITMs, a body which contains the actual protocol code, and a
shell to address modelling functions. Shell and protocol share their externally
writable and outgoing tapes, and the shell has write access to all the body’s
tapes (except for the identity tape).
UC-emulation A proof of security for a protocol π in the UC setting considers
an evolving system of ITM instances, where the initial instance Z is known as
the environment, and the instance with pid  is known as the adversary A. The
control function allows Z to pass input to A and any ITI with code π and a
fixed sid s, without having to use its extended identity as a sender (the identities
used by Z are known as external identities). A can only communicate with
existing instances and only using their backdoor tapes. All other ITIs include
their extended identities in outgoing messages, and can pass input and outputs
to ITIs besides Z or A; but if the target to a message does not exist, it is passed
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as a subroutine-output to Z. A protocol is subroutine respecting if only the main
ITIs of a session can communicate with instances in the extended session.
A γ-subroutine respecting protocol relaxes the conditions of subroutine re-
specting protocols by also allowing external calls to parties that belong to mul-
tiple sessions of γ and to machines in those extended sessions.
γ is a φ-regular setup if it has no subsidiary with code φ, and if γ does not
instantiate a new instance of φ as part of the output of a subroutine.
While the above control function allows Z to send messages to π’s main par-
ties with identity set to arbitrary ITIs outside of the protocol (external identities),
a ξ-identity-bounded environment is allowed to only use identities satisfying ξ, a
polynomial time boolean predicate on the current system configuration. As the
environment is responsible with setting their import, modelling of realistic con-
ditions requires the adversary’s computational resources to be at least as large
as the protocol it is trying to attack (otherwise, the adversary might not run
for the entire protocol execution). Thus, a balanced environment provides the
adversary with import at least equal to the sum of all instances in the protocol.
Definition 7 (UC emulation). Given two PPT protocols π, φ and some pred-
icate ξ, we say that π UC-emulates φ with respect to ξ-identity bound environ-
ments (or π ξ-UC-emulates φ, if ξ allows all external identities this simplifies to
π UC-emulates φ) if for any balanced ξ-identity-bounded environment and any
PPT adversary, there exists a PPT simulator S such that the probability distri-
bution for the outputs of systems (φ,S,Z) and (π,A,Z) are indistinguishable.
A common variant of the emulation theorem replaces the universal quantifier
over adversaries with a single “dummy adversary” D, who simply transfers mes-
sages through parties’ backdoor tapes on behalf of the environment, who now
has full control over the adversarial protocol.
In practice, in a proof of security, we take φ to be an ideal functionality, a
protocol that acts as a trusted third party that perfectly executes the functional-
ity it expresses, without accepting corrupt messages from the adversary. We say
that protocol IDEALF is the protocol that comprises of the ideal functionality ITI
F , which cannot be corrupted by adversarial calls, and a set of dummy parties
that reproduce the structure of a realistic distributed protocol, but in practice
forward all inputs and receive outputs from F . We say that if some protocol π
ξ-UC-emulates IDEALF and is ξ-subroutine respecting, then π ξ-UC-realises F .
A protocol ρ is said to be (π, φ, ξ)-compliant if ITIs in ρ that make subroutine
calls to φ or π satisfy ξ, and make no calls to protocol instances of π and φ that
belong to the same session. A protocol is subroutine exposing if it allows the
adversary to find out if a certain ITI belongs to its extended session.
Definition 8 (Universal Composition). Given PPT protocols π, φ, ρ and
predicate ξ, if π, φ are both subroutine respecting and subroutine exposing, ρ
is (π, phi, ξ)-compliant and π ξ-UC-emulates φ, the protocol ρφ→π UC-emulates
ρ, where ρφ→π is the protocol where all of ρ’s calls to subroutine φ are replaced
with calls to subroutine π
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C Proof of security Hybrids
We proceed to show that the real world execution with respect to the Steel
protocol and dummy adversary is indistinguishable from the ideal execution
w.r.t. the ideal functionality FESR and the simulator described in Section 5. Let
Hybrid 0 be the real world execution w.r.t. to the Steel protocol and dummy
adversary.
Hybrid 1 We define Hybrid 1 to be identical to 0, but as translated to the ideal
world; that is, we replace protocol Steel with a protocol consisting of dummy
parties A,B,C and ideal functionality FE; the dummy adversary machine is re-
placed by a simulator S ′FESR, who emulates Steel’s execution by emulating all
operations that would normally be run by the honest parties. Messages are now
sent to the ideal functionality, but the responses are ignored and the original
protocol is perfectly executed by S ′FESR. Hybrid 0 and 1 are indistinguishable by
UC-emulation, and because their behaviour is equivalent due to simulator S ′FESR.
Since the ideal functionality is not visible to the environment, it is harmless for
the dummy parties to send messages to it.
Lemma 1. H0 is identical to H1.
Hybrid 2 diverges from Hybrid 1 in that all signature verifications obtained
with the attestation public key vkatt are replaced by the process of storing all
outgoing messages from the Gatt functionality in a map data structure, and
checking on verification that the message and corresponding signature were cor-
rectly recorded. The behaviour of the two hybrids is equivalent, as long as the
adversary in Hybrid 2 is not able to provide a signature such that the verification
checks are successful, even if the messages were not recorded as coming through
the Gatt functionality. Assuming the unforgeability property of Gatt’s signature
scheme is satisfied, Hybrid 1 is then indistinguishable to Hybrid 2.
Lemma 2. If Σ is EU-CMA secure then H1 ≈ H2, over the randomness used
by all parties in H1, H2.
Proof. To prove the indistinguishability of the two hybrids, we show how an
environment Z that breaks attestation can be used to build an adversary R that
breaks unforgeability of the signature scheme.
For attestation to break, the adversary needs to produce signature σ such that
Σ.Vrfy(vkatt, σ, (sid, eidX, progX, out)) = 1 for some program progX and output out
such that no execution of progX under sid produced out with attestation σ
We now describe adversary R, whose goal is to break signature game CΣ by




spk Public key for game CΣ
H ← {} Repository of message requests
G ← {} Collects all enclave programs registered by Z
state← {} Dictionary to hold the state for each function
On message (setup, P ):
if mpk = ⊥ then
(mpk,msk)← PKE.PGen(1λ)
send Get to CRS and receive (Crs, crs)
if P = A then
send (setup,mpk) to SCA
else if P = B then
send (setup,mpk, eidKME) to SCB and receive (provision, σ, eidDE, pkKD)
m← (sid, eidDE, progDE, pk)
if Σ.Vrfy(spk,m, σ) ∧ σ 6∈ CΣ.Q then
output (m, σ) to CΣ
c← PKE.Enc(pk,msk)
σKME ← CΣ.Osign(sid, eid, progKME, c)
send (provision, c, σKME)) to SCB
On message (keygen,F,B):
if F 6∈ F ∨mpk = ⊥ then return ⊥
σ ← CΣ.Osign(keygen,F)
state← ~0
send (keygen, (F, σ)) to SCB
On message (encrypt,m):
if mpk = ⊥ ∨m 6∈ X then return ⊥
h← getHandle;H[h]← m
return (encrypted, h)
On message (read, h) from party B to REP:
m← H[h]
r← {0, 1}λ; ct← PKE.Enc(mpk,m; r)
π ← P((mpk, ct), (m, r), crs)
return (ct, π)
On message getpk from B to Gatt:
return spk
On message (install, idx, prog) from B to Gatt:
eid ← {0, 1}λ
G[eid]← (idx, prog)
send eid to B
On message (resume, eid, input) from B to Gatt:
if input[0] = init-setup then
if G[eid][1] 6= progDE then abort
(init-setup, eidKME, crs)← input
(pk, sk)← PKE.PGen(1λ)
output← (pk, eidKME, crs)
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σ ← CΣ.Osign(sid, eid, progDE, output)
forward (output, σ) to B
else if input[0] = complete-setup then
if G[eid][1] 6= progDE then abort
(complete-setup, ctkey, σKME)← input
m← (G[eid][0], eidKME, progKME, ctkey)
if Σ.Vrfy(spk,m, σKME) ∧ σKME 6∈ CΣ.Q then
output (m, σKME) to CΣ
else if input[0] = provision then
if G[eid][1] 6= progDE then abort
(provision, σ, eid, pkFD, skF,F)← input
m1 ← (G[eid][0], eidKME, progKME, (keygen,F))
if Σ.Vrfy(spk,m1, skF) ∧ skF 6∈ CΣ.Q then
output (m1, σ) to CΣ
m2 ← (G[eid][0], eid, progFE[F], pkFD)
if Σ.Vrfy(spk,m2, σ) ∧ σ 6∈ CΣ.Q then
output (m2, σ) to CΣ
ct← PKE.Enc(pkFD,msk), output← (ct, crs)
σDE ← CΣ.Osign(sid, eid, progDE, output)
forward (output, σDE) to B
else if input[0] = run then
if G[eid][1] 6= progFE[F] then abort
(run, σ, eidDE, ctkey, ctmsg, crs, y
′)← input
if y′ 6= ⊥ then
out← y′
else
m← (G[eid][0], eidDE, progDE, ctkey, crs)
if Σ.Vrfy(spk,m, σ) ∧ σ 6∈ CΣ.Q then
output (m, σ) to CΣ
if N.V((mpk, ct), π, crs) = 0 then return ⊥
mem← state
(output,mem′)← F (PKE.Dec(msk, ctmsg),mem)
σFE ← CΣ.Osign(sid, eid, progDE, out)
forward (out, σFE) to B
Hybrid 3 Let Hybrid 3 replace the output of calls to the provision procedure for
enclave KME with new value (ct′, σ), where ct′ ← PKE.Enc(pkKD, 0|sk|) for the
legitimate pkKD, sk held within the enclave, and σ is a valid attestation signature
for an execution that produces ct′. If the PKE scheme internal to the KME
program is CCA-secure, the two hybrids are indistinguishable to an attacker. Let
Hybrid 3.1 replace the return value of calls to procedure provision on enclave
DE with (ct′, σ), with ct′ ← PKE.Enc(pkFD, 0|sk|) and σ being a valid attestation
signature on the produced output. Similarly, this hybrid is indistinguishable to
the previous if PKE provides CCA security.
Below, we prove the following to lemmas, via reductions to CCA security of
the encryption scheme. The two reductions are quite similar and depicted below.
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Lemma 3. If PKE is CCA secure, then H2 ≈ H3, over the randomness used by
H2, H3.
Lemma 4. If PKE is CCA secure, then H3 ≈ H3.1, over the randomness used
by those experiments.
Proof. We use an adversary Z who can distinguish between the two hybrids H2
and H3 to construct an adversary R with the goal of breaking the CCA-security
game challenger CPKE. The challenge encryption ct replaces the encryption of
pkKD, the public key used to securely transfer the master secret key between
the progKME and progDE enclaves. Z also instantiates a signature scheme Σ to
reproduce the attestation role of Gatt
Note: for this and all following reductions, we follow the convention that,
for all subroutines (or parts of subroutines) not explicitly defined in the current
reduction, the same code as the previous reduction applies. Furthermore, any
calls to the challenge game is replaced with the corresponding primitive.
Reduction RZ,CPKE
State variables Description
pkKD Public key for game CPKE
H ← {} Repository of message requests
G ← {} Collects all enclave programs registered by Z
state← {} Dictionary to hold the state for each function
On message (setup, P ):
if mpk = ⊥ then
(mpk,msk)← PKE.PGen(1λ)
(spk, ssk)← Σ.Gen(1λ)
send Get to CRS and receive (Crs, crs)
if P = A then
send (setup,mpk) to SCA
else if P = B then
send (setup,mpk, eidKME) to SCB and receive (provision, σ, eidDE, pkKD)
m0 ← msk;m1 ← 0|msk|
send (challenge,m0,m1) to CPKE and receive ct
σsk ← Σ.Sign(ssk, (idx, eidKME, progKME, ct))
send (provision, ct, σsk)) to SCB
On message (resume, eid, input) from B to Gatt:
if input[0] = init-setup then
if G[eid][1] 6= progDE then abort
(init-setup, eidKME, crs)← input
output← (pkKD, eidKME, crs)
forward (output,Σ.Sign(ssk, (sid, eid, progKME, output)))
else
...
On message (Dec, k, c) from Z to PKE:
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On message (output, b) from Z:
output b
Let Z be an adversary that distinguishes between H3 and H3.1; we construct
an adversary R which calls onto Z to win the CCA game, by serving the challenge




pkFD Public key for game CPKE
H ← {} Repository of message requests
G ← {} Collects all enclave programs registered by Z
On message (setup, P ):
if mpk = ⊥ then
(mpk,msk)← PKE.PGen(1λ)
(spk, ssk)← Σ.Gen(1λ)
send Get to CRS and receive (Crs, crs)
if P = A then
send (setup,mpk) to SCA
else if P = B then
send (setup,mpk, eidKME) to SCB and receive (provision, σ, eidDE, pkKD)
ct← PKE.Enc(pkKD,msk)
σsk ← Σ.Sign(ssk, (idx, eidKME, progKME, ct))
send (provision, ct, σsk)) to SCB
On message (resume, eid, input) from B to Gatt:
if input[0] = init-setup then
if G[eid][1] 6= progDE then abort
(init-setup, eidKME, crs)← input
(pk, sk)← PKE.PGen(1λ)
output← (pk, eidKME, crs)
σ ← Σ.Sign(ssk, (sid, eid, progDE, output))
forward (output, σ) to B
else if input[0] = provision then
if G[eid] 6= progDE then abort
m0 ← msk;m1 ← 0|msk|
send (challenge,m0,m1) to CPKE and receive ct
output← (ct, crs)




Hybrid 4 This hybrid differs from H3.1 in how the Proof of Plaintext Knowl-
edge is computed for a message encryption. Namely, instead of making calls to
the honest prover, it simply creates simulated proofs using the trapdoor. The
reduction defined below receives oracle access to either P or S2. Therefore, by
distinguishing between the two experiments, one can break the zero-knowledge
property of the NIZK scheme N. More formally, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Assuming the zero-knowledge property of N,H3.1 ≈ H4, over the
randomness used by those experiments.
Proof. Given adversary Z, which is capable of distinguishing between the two
hybrids, we define an adversary R, with the goal of breaking the zero-knowledge




H ← {} Repository of message requests
G ← {} Collects all enclave programs registered by Z
J ← {} Storage of N proofs
state← {} Dictionary to hold the state for each function
(crs, τ)← N.S1 Simulated reference string and trapdoor
On message (setup, P ):




On message (read, h) from party B to REP:
m← H[h]; send Get to CRS and receive (Crs, crs)
r← {0, 1}λ; ct← PKE.Enc(mpk,m; r)
send (challenge, (mpk, ct), (r,m)) to CN and receive π
J [ctmsg]← π
return (ct, π)
On message (P, input) from Z to N:
send (challenge, input) to CN and receive π
return π
On message (output, b) from Z:
output b
Hybrid 5 This hybrid is identical to H4, but instead of executing the decryption
of honestly generated ciphertexts, the decryptor enclave executes the extractor
for the NIZK scheme to obtain the original plaintext message. This value is then
encrypted by sending it to the ideal functionality, which stores it in its internal
repository.
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Lemma 6. Assuming the extractability property of N, H4 ≈ H5, over the ran-
domness used by those experiments.
Proof. Given an adversary Z capable of distinguishing between the two hybrids,
we define an adversary R with the goal of breaking extractability game CN.
Reduction RZ,CN
State variables Description
H ← {} Repository of message requests
J ← {} Storage of N proofs
G ← {} Collects all enclave programs registered by Z
state← {} Dictionary to hold the state for each function
(crs, τ)← N.S1 Simulated reference string and trapdoor
On message (resume, eid, input) from B to Gatt:
if input[0] = run then
if G[eid][1] 6= progFE[F] then abort
(run, σ, eidDE, ctkey, ctmsg, crs, y
′)← input
if y′ 6= ⊥ then
out← y′
else
if Σ.Vrfy(spk, (G[eid][0], eidDE, progDE, ctkey, crs), σ) = 0 then return ⊥
if J [ctmsg] = ⊥ then
(ct, π)← ctmsg
if π ∈ J [(·, π)] then send (decrypt, F,⊥) to B and abort
(m, r)← E(τ, (mpk, ct), π)
if N.V((mpk, ct), π, crs) = 0∨PKE.Enc(mpk,m; r) 6= ct∨ ctmsg 6∈ CN.Q
then
output 1 to CN
mem← state
(output,mem′)← F(m,mem); out← output
σFE ← Σ.Sign(sid, eid, progDE, out)
forward (out, σFE) to B
else
...
Hybrid 6 This hybrid diverges from H5 by replacing REP’s copy of any message
encrypted by A with an encryption of a string of zeros with the same length as
the original plaintext message. Decryption is handled through the FESR func-
tionality. The two hybrids can be distinguished by an adversary who can tell
apart the two encrypted cyphertext, by winning the CPA security game.
Lemma 7. Assuming CPA security, H5 ≈εcca H6, over the randomness used by
those experiments.
Proof. Given adversary Z who can distinguish between H6 and H5, we construct




pk Public key for game CPKE
G ← {} Collects all enclave programs registered by Z
H ← {} Repository of message requests
On message (setup, P ):
if mpk = ⊥ then
mpk← pk
(spk, ssk)← Σ.Gen(1λ)
send Get to CRS and receive (Crs, crs)
...
On message (read, h) from party B to REP:
m0 ← H[h];m1 ← 0|m0|
send (challenge,m0,m1) to CPKE and receive ct, r
π ← N.S2(crs, τ, (mpk, ct))
return (ct, π)
On message (Enc, k,m) from Z to PKE:
if k = mpk then return CPKE.Enc(pk,m)
else return PKE.Enc(k, ct)
On message (output, b) from Z:
output b
Hybrid 7 In the last two hybrids we replace the encryption the zero-strings (for
the secret keys of the internal scheme) with the original keys. Therefore we have
the following lemmas.
Lemma 8. Assuming CCA security, H6 ≈εcca H7, over the randomness used by
those experiments.
Lemma 9. Assuming CCA security, H7 ≈εcca H7.1, over the randomness used
by those experiments.
The reduction proceeds as in the parallel CCA hybrids (in the other direction)
and is thus omitted.
Summary Note how H7.1 is in fact equivalent to the Simulator: we have shifted to
an ideal world protocol (H1) where the protocol can proceed only if the simulator
verifies through attestation that the enclave programs are being run in the cor-
rect order (H2) and we leak no information about inter-enclave secure channels
(H3,H3.1). We then switch, through H4 and H5, from using genuine NIZK provers
and verifiers (respectively) for honest parties into simulating the proof and ex-
tracting the witness (resp). By switching from encrypting messages to strings of
zeros (H6), we ensure no leakage is possible, while still using the original secrets
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for establishing secure channels (H7,H7.1). The final construction corresponds
to our definition of the simulator in 5, and thus, through the subsequence of
hybrids, protocol Steel UC emulates the ideal functionality FESR.
We now argue that all requirements of the UCGS theorem with respect to
Steel, FESR and Gatt are satisfied. In particular we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 10.
1. The functionality Gatt is FESR-regular setup and subroutine respecting,
2. FESR,Steel are Gatt-subroutine respecting,
Proof. As required by Definition 3.3 of [10], the global functionality Gatt does
not invoke any new ITI of FESR and does not have an ITI with code FESR
as subsidiary. Clearly, Gatt is subroutine respecting. Also, FESR and Steel are
Gatt-subroutine respecting since they only make external calls to Gatt.
By the UCGS theorem [10] (see Theorem 2), Theorem 3 and the above lemma,
UCGS security of the Steel protocol is concluded, i.e., for any parent protocol ρ
which is (Steel, IDEALFESR, ξ)-compliant and (Steel,M [x,Gatt], ξ)-compliant for
x ∈ {IDEALFESR,Steel}, the protocol ρφ→π UC-emulates ρ.
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